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ABSTRACT 
Throughout history, the Aegean Sea has been a sea of crisis. Today, Turkey and 
Greece—the two countries surrounding the Aegean Sea—continue to dispute several 
issues regarding the Aegean. The most significant dispute is over the sovereignty of 
several islands. This research presents a method to produce an arbitration solution to 
allocate these disputed islands between the two countries. We identify 39 disputed islands 
and six important attributes for each island, including perimeter, area, population, 
distance to Greece, distance to Turkey, and territorial water area. After applying spatial 
analysis to two open-source maps, we apply utility theory, the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process, and the Nash arbitration scheme to propose an arbitration solution. The 
arbitration solution tends to allocate to Turkey those islands with larger areas of territorial 
waters and greater proximity to the Turkish mainland, and allocate to Greece those 
islands with larger population and greater proximity to the Greek mainland. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Throughout history, the Aegean Sea has been a ground for many conflicts. The 
Aegean Sea is surrounded by two states today, Turkey and Greece. During the 20th 
century, the tensions between these two countries increased several times due to several 
issues regarding the Aegean Sea. Among these issues, the dispute over the sovereignty of 
the “Gray Zone Islands” comes forth as the basic conflict between the two countries. This 
thesis proposes an approach to reconcile this dispute. The approach consists of three 
steps: (1) apply spatial analysis to obtain geographical parameters for these disputed 
islands; (2) use utility theory and the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to score each 
island for each country; and (3) apply the Nash arbitration scheme to partition the 
disputed islands impartially between the two countries. 
In the first step, we identify 39 disputed islands and six parameters for these 
islands, including perimeter, area, population, distance to Greece, distance to Turkey, and 
territorial water area. To obtain these geographical parameters, we use ArcMap 10.3 to 
process two open-source maps, and use a statistical package, R, to create our dataset. 
These six parameters for each island form the basis for an arbitration solution. 
In the second step, we convert the values of each parameter into utilities between 
0 and 1 via utility curves. We then use AHP—a method that relies on pairwise 
comparison between parameters to weight the importance of each parameter—to compute 
a composite utility value for each island by a weighted average of individual parameter 
utilities. 
In the third step, we frame the dispute over these islands as a two-person nonzero-
sum game, and use the Nash arbitration scheme to partition the disputed islands equitably 
between the two players, Turkey and Greece. To use the Nash arbitration scheme, we 
assume that if either player refuses the arbitration solution, then neither country will get 
any of these disputed islands. 
Since Turkey advocates a six nautical mile extension of territorial waters, while 
Greece advocates 12 nautical miles, we solve this model twice. In the case of the six 
 xvi 
nautical mile extension, the Nash arbitration solution assigns 22 of the disputed islands to 
Turkey and the other 17 to Greece. In the case of the 12 nautical mile extension, the 
solution assigns 24 islands to Turkey and the other 15 to Greece. In both cases, the 
islands that are closer to the Turkish mainland and have a larger area of territorial waters 
tend to be ceded to Turkey, and the islands that have a larger population and are closer to 
the Greek mainland tend to be ceded to Greece. Increasing the territorial waters from six 
nautical miles to 12 nautical miles has a minor impact on the arbitration solution. 
There are several ways to extend our work. First, we can add other parameters 
into our model, such as the natural resources on each island and merchant shipping 
intensity within the territorial waters of each island. Second, when assessing the utilities 
and applying AHP, government officials or scholars at research institutions may be able 
to provide a more objective assessment. Finally, our proposed approach can be applied to 
other conflicted (or non-conflicted) regions, such as the disputed islands in the South 
China Sea. 
  
 xvii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
During my education in NPS, I found many opportunities to develop myself not 
only in an academic way, but also in a professional and personal way. The strong 
friendships I have gained and the experiences I have been through are invaluable. Hence, 
I would like to express my gratitude to all the Turkish citizens whose taxes provided my 
education here. 
I also want to express my deepest appreciations to my advisor, Professor Kyle 
Lin, for his unwavering patience and tremendous amount of help. I would also like to 
thank to my second reader, Professor Lyn Whitaker, for her diligent guidance and interest 
in the subject.  
I am also thankful to Professor Alan Washburn and Professor Owen Guillermo for 
their support and input throughout the whole process. 
Finally, I would like to express that I am greatly indebted to my parents for their 
most-sincere love and understanding. Miles away, I have always felt their presence and 
support with me. 
 
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE AEGEAN SEA 
The Aegean Sea, also known as the Sea of the Islands, is located in the north of 
the Mediterranean Sea, between Asia and Europe. It covers an area that reaches from 
Western and Southern Anatolia to Greece, Macedonia, and Eastern Thrace. It holds a 
very important position providing one of the major trade routes between the Eastern and 
Western worlds. It is the only way to the Black Sea market via sea lanes and the only exit 
for Black Sea Navies to other seas. The islands are scattered all over the Aegean Sea, 
which provides geopolitical importance in consonance with their locations. The Aegean 
Sea is also important for its easy reach to the East and Central Mediterranean.  
Throughout history, the Aegean Sea has been a ground for many conflicts based 
on its strategic advantages. Trojans, Ancient Greeks, Persians, Macedonians, Lydians, 
Ionians, Romans, Byzantines, Venetians, Ottomans, and many others have used this sea 
of plentiful resources for the wealth of their people and for expanding their influence over 
other regions. It is obvious that whomever controlled the Aegean Sea ruled over that 
geography during their times. Several reasons support this conclusion. Commercial 
superiority and transportation of people and/or vital goods like food, defensive materials, 
and troops are the key benefits of holding maritime superiority in the Aegean. Islands that 
are spread out across the sea enable long-lasting campaigns by providing naval bases and 
havens from foul weather, while operating as a replenishment points for merchant ships.  
Today, the Aegean Sea is surrounded by two states, Turkey and Greece. It covers 
an area of about 214,000 km2 between the Balkan and Anatolian Peninsulas (Ak, 2014a). 
According to some sources, it is assumed that there are over 1800 islands, islets and rocks 
of various sorts in the whole Aegean Sea. (For some of the major islands, see Figure 1; 
for island names, see the Appendix.)  
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Figure 1.  The Aegean Sea. 
 
Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” 
 
Most of the islands and islets belong to Greece, leaving Turkey a limited area of 
territorial waters and limiting the international waters in the Aegean. According to Mann 
(2001), Greece “thinks of the Aegean as (for the most part) a Greek Sea, and regards 
Turkey as following an aggressive policy that contests Greek sovereignty and sovereign 
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rights, as well as the legal status quo in the Aegean”; however, “Turkey, on the other 
hand, believes that the Aegean is a common entity that should be shared equally between 
the two countries and that both countries should respect each other’s vital interests.” 
Keeping these in mind, there are many issues between the two sides, as in the following.  
• Territorial waters 
• Continental shelf 
• Flight Information Region (FIR) 
• Militarization of the islands in demilitarized status 
• Sovereignty of disputed islands (Gray Zone Islands) 
During the 20th century, tensions between both countries have been strained by 
these issues. Furthermore, the two states came to the brink of war during the Kardak 
(Imia) Crisis in 1996 due to the dispute over sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. 
After beginning with exploratory talks in 2002, both countries have continued 
trying to solve the disputed issues. However, new problems and developments have 
arisen, such as the crises of Syrian refugees seeking refuge in Europe via the Aegean Sea. 
Due to the emergence of the Islamic State in the Middle East, many refugees have left 
their homes hoping to find a new beginning and a safer life. According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) statistics, by July 2015, of the 
4,013,000 Syrian refugees around the world, 1,805,255 are registered to seek asylum in 
Turkey. After the drowning of many refugees attempting to flee to the Greek Islands 
from Turkey, the Aegean Sea has become a huge humanitarian crisis.  
The dispute over sovereignty of the “Gray Zone Islands” comes forth as the basic 
conflict between the two countries. The resolution of this conflict will provide a basis for 
overcoming the other major and minor issues in peaceful terms. Keeping that in mind, 
this thesis focuses on analyzing these “Gray Zone Islands” using spatial analysis tools, 
and applying game theoretical approaches to find a reconciliation basis between the two 
countries. It introduces the main disputes between the two countries in Chapter II, and 
discusses the spatial analysis over the geographical data according to the thesis of both 
countries about territorial waters in Chapter III. Chapter IV covers the utilization of the 
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islands and application of game theory, and Chapter V reflects our findings and 
recommendations. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS  
From the beginning of the 20th century, the Aegean Sea has been a sea of crisis. 
Greece came about as an independent country in 1830 taking sovereignty over Eğriboz 
(Evvoia) Island and the Cyclades (Southwestern Aegean) Islands in addition to the Greek 
mainland. After the emergence of Greece, Greece extended her maritime territory in the 
Ionian and western Aegean Sea. In 1865, the Sporades Islands that are strategically very 
important to Greece mainland were ceded to Greece (Kurumahmut & Başeren, 2004).  
In 1911, the Kingdom of Italy occupied Libya and the Tripolitania regions of the 
Ottoman Empire. During the course of the War of Tripolitania, Italy illicitly occupied the 
southeastern Aegean Islands, which are known today as the Menteşe (Dodecanese) 
Islands to force the Ottomans to negotiate for peace. Although these islands should have 
been handed over to Ottoman authorities, according to the Treaty of Ouchy (1912), the 
Italian government refused to turn over the islands with the excuse of the emerging 
Balkan War.  
After the Turco-Italian War, during the 1912 Balkan War, Greece invaded the 
islands of Taşoz (Tasos), Semadirek (Samotraki), Gökçeada (Imros), Limni (Limnos), 
Bozcaada (Tenedos), Bozbaba (Evstratios), Midilli (Lesvos), Sakız (Thios), İpsara 
(Psara), Sisam (Samos) and Ahikerya (Ikaria) under Ottoman sovereignty (Kurumahmut 
& Başeren, 2004). After the Balkan Wars, during the London Conference in 1913, the 
Ottoman Empire accepted the terms of ceding the rights over the Girit (Crete) Island to 
Greece and arbitration of European Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Italy and Russia) over all of the Ottoman islands in the Aegean Sea. In 1914, 
the verdict of the arbitration gave sovereignty over all islands except for Gökçeada 
(Imros), Bozcaada (Tenedos), and Meis (Castellorizo) to Greece under the condition of 
demilitarization (Ak, 2014b). 
During the Lausanne Agreement in 1923, all of the islands except for Eğriboz 
Island, the North Sporades Islands, the Cyclades, Çuha, Küçük Çuha, and Crete, were 
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discussed and a new status quo in the Aegean Sea had been set. As Turkey’s sovereignty 
over Gökçeada (Imros), Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Tavşan Islands were confirmed by 
the treaty, the islands of Limni, Semadirek, Midilli, Sakız, Sisam, and Ahikerya stated by 
name were confirmed to be under Greek sovereignty (Kurumahmut & Başeren, 2004). 
Moreover, unless no verdict on the contrary was mentioned, all the islands within three 
miles of the Turkish coast were ceded to Turkey. Despite not being mentioned by name, 
the islands of Taşoz, Bozbaba, and İpsara were left to Greece from the verdict by 
arbitration by the six European Great Powers in 1914, since these islands were under 
Greek occupation after the Balkans War. 
During the Lausanne Treaty (1923), Turkey agreed to renounce her rights of 
sovereignty for the 13 islands mentioned by name and their “dependent islets” and Meis 
(Castellorizo) in the region of the Menteşe (Dodecanese) Islands, which had been under 
Italian occupation since 1912 (in favor of Italy).   
After losing to the Allies in World War II, Italy ceded sovereignty and all her 
rights over Meis and other Menteşe Islands mentioned by name, and their “adjacent 
islands,” in favor of Greece with the condition that they be demilitarized (Van Dyke, 
2005). 
In December 1995, a Turkish merchant ship named Figen Agat grounded on the 
Kardak Rocks (Imia Islets) which consist of two uninhabited rocks (see Figure 2). Both 
Turkey and Greece claimed that the incident happened in their territorial waters and had 
the right to provide a rescue mission. This was the first time the sovereignty of the 
disputed islands was put forward by Turkey. Over the course of the events, Greek Special 
Forces landed on the east islet, and as a reaction to the Greeks landing, Turkish 
commandos landed on the west islet. Tensions escalated very quickly and both countries 
were on the brink of war. Turkish and Greek Navies were positioned around the islets for 
reconnaissance and further reactions if necessary. The tension de-escalated with the 
assistance of the United States without causing any military conflict.  
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Figure 2.  Kardak/Imia Islands. 
 
Image retrieved from Google Earth, May 20, 2015, https://www.google.com/earth/. 
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II. CONTEMPORARY AEGEAN SEA ISSUES BETWEEN 
TURKEY AND GREECE 
A. TERRITORIAL WATERS 
During the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, both sides came to terms with each other 
over the three-mile extension of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea. In 1936, Greece 
extended her territorial waters to six miles unilaterally, finding no opposition from the 
Turkish side. When that happened, the status quo set in terms of territorial waters had 
degenerated in favor of Greece. In 1964, Turkey announced her extension to six miles, 
setting a new status quo in the Aegean Sea.  
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-III) states 
that “every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles” (Van Dyke, 2005). Due to a considerable extent to the 
provision, Turkey did not sign the UNCLOS-III. The other non-signatories were the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Peru (Heraclides, 2010). Thus, Turkey rejected the Greek thesis over 
extension of territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean. 
After UNCLOS-III in 1982, the Greek authorities put forward their intension to 
extend territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. That action found a strong and dedicated 
opposition on the Turkish side. UNCLOS-III came into force in 1994, and in 1995, 
Greece announced a unilateral expansion of the territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. 
Turkey responded to that move, and as a counter action, announced that this Greek 
practice was a Casus Belli (an act or event that provokes or is used to justify war).  
In 2010, Turkey deleted the 1996 Casus Belli policy over the Greek expansion of 
territorial waters to 12 miles from the National Security Policy Document as a goodwill 
gesture in the course of exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey. Since 2002, 
exploratory talks have been made between both sides. Today, a six-mile status quo has 
still been in force; however, Greek arguments about the issue have stayed basically the 
same.  
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1. Turkish Thesis 
In the 1980s, Turkey claimed that the Greek expansion to six miles in 1936 was 
not as innocent as it seemed, and it was part of a hidden agenda to render the Aegean Sea 
a “Greek Lake” (Heraclides, 2010). The Turkish thesis is centered on the retention of the 
six-mile status quo. 
First of all, Turkey is not obligated to accept the Greek enforcement because 
Turkey did not sign or ratify the convention. Secondly, the extension of territorial waters 
cannot be done unilaterally. Article 300 of the UNCLOS-III (1982c) convention states 
that, “States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.” Based on this 
article, Turkey asserts that the practice of extension should fulfill Article 300 first, and a 
Greek expansion to 12 miles is a clear abuse of that article.  
Another claim made by Turkey in reference to UNCLOS-III Article 122 and 123 
(1982b), is that the Aegean Sea is a “semi-enclosed sea,” and the coordination and 
cooperation of countries are required in the exercise of rights to avoid any abuse of rights. 
Such an extension would prevent the implementation of Turkey’s rights and navigational 
freedom in the Aegean Sea. According to Heraclides (2010), with the existing six-mile 
status quo, Greece controls 43.68% of the Aegean Sea, while Turkey owns 7.5%, leaving 
49% as international waters. The enforcement of 12 miles would change this scenario 
drastically, Heraclides continues, by allowing Greece to have 71.53% and limiting the 
open sea to only 19.71%. In the aftermath of the 12-mile extension, Turkey would be 
locked up in Anatolia with almost 3,000 miles of coastline in the Aegean Sea, and left 
with no passage to open sea (Heraclides, 2010). Turkey thus asserts that the 
consequences of such an expansion would be economically, culturally, and strategically 
devastating.  
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2. Greek Thesis 
In general, there are two main Greek theses in regard to the 12-mile extension of 
territorial waters. The first Greek thesis is that the regulation of territorial waters in 
UNCLOS-III has become a conventional law and a norm, and Greece is rightfully able to 
extend the breadth to 12 miles.  
The second Greek thesis claims that the expansion of territorial waters is a norm 
only binding the regulator state with domestic law regulations, and thus, Greece can act 
unilaterally in this sense. Regarding the Article 123 of UNCLOS-III, the Greek side 
expresses that this is not an obligatory rule, and hence, does not have to negotiate its 
terms. Therefore, Greece does not accept the existence of such disputes stating that it is 
decided merely by UNCLOS-III. 
B. THE DISPUTED ISLANDS 
During the Kardak Crisis in 1996, a new issue emerged between Turkey and 
Greece: sovereignty over some islands in the Aegean Sea. Some islands and islets were 
claimed by both countries, pushing bilateral relations to the edge in recent decades. Since 
the disputed islands constitute a sovereignty issue and the resolution would change the 
map of the Aegean Sea, especially in terms of territorial waters and the continental shelf, 
this appears to be the most important and basic conflict between the two countries. 
“Sovereignty disputes exist as a result of ambiguous language in the governing treaties 
listed [in the following paragraphs] and also because certain small islands were not 
mentioned by any treaty” and leaving some “matters in doubt” by the definition of some 
terms such as “adjacent” or “dependent” islands (Van Dyke, 2005).  
The sovereignty issue has its roots in the first quarter of 20th century. During the 
Turco-Italo Libyan War in 1911–1912, Italy invaded the Menteşe (Dodacanese) Islands 
to force Turkey to accept her peace terms. With regard to the Treaty of Ouchy, Italian 
forces were supposed to be extracted after the extraction of Ottomanese forces from 
Libya. Meanwhile, in the Balkans, four states that acquired their independence from the 
Ottoman Empire in the last century, declared war upon the Ottomans. Italy took 
advantage of this new situation and using the Greek threat as an excuse, announced that 
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Italy would not withdraw from the islands. During the Balkans War, Greece invaded and 
took control of the islands of Taşoz (Tasos), Semadirek (Samotraki), Gökçeada (Imros), 
Limni (Limnos), Bozcaada (Tenedos), Bozbaba (Evstratios), Midilli (Lesvos), Sakız 
(Thios), İpsara (Psara), Sisam (Samos), and Ahikerya (Ikaria). Except for Gökçeada and 
Bozcaada, all the islands that were under Greek occupation were ceded to Greece 
according to the verdict of the arbitration by six European Great Powers (Ak, 2014b). 
After the war between Greece and Turkey ended, and the Greek invasion of 
Western Anatolia failed in 1922, peace negotiations started in the city of Lausanne, 
Switzerland with the attendance of Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
Japan, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (later Yugoslavia) (“Treaty of Peace,” 
1923). The United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and Bulgaria also attended, but they 
only attended the sessions regarding the Turkish Straits. Articles 12, 15, and 16 of 
UNCLOS-III encompass the regulations over sovereginty of the islands in this treaty. 
Article 12 regulates the islands ceded to Greece in the Eastern Aegean Sea stating 
that: 
other than the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly 
the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, 
is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the 
islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of 
Article 15. Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the 
present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic 
coast remain under Turkish sovereignty. (“Treaty of Peace,” 1923) 
Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty, which regards the Italian-occupied Menteşe 
Islands, states that “Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the 
following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, 
Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, 
Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the 
islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo” (“Treaty of Peace,” 
1923).  
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Finally, in Article 16, it is stated that: 
Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting 
the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty 
and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised 
by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled 
or to be settled by the parties concerned. The provisions of the present 
Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from 
neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between 
Turkey and any limitrophe countries. (“Treaty of Peace,” 1923) 
After World War II, with the Paris Peace Treaty, Italy renounced her sovereignty 
and rights over the islands mentioned above in Article 15 of the Lausanne Treaty in favor 
of Greece.  
Overall, although the islands that were ceded to Greece were worded by name in 
the treaties mentioned above, Greece claims other islands and islets are a part of this 
island sets, pointing out Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty. However, in Turkey’s view, 
this article does not mean a mass renunciation. Another issue is the definition of 
“dependent” or “adjacent” islands. There are no such definitions in terms of international 
law, which causes another point of conflict. Today each country has developed its own 
thesis over the sovereignty issue. 
1. Turkish Thesis 
The Turkish thesis is that the islands that were not mentioned by name were not 
ceded to any country. Since the Republic of Turkey is the successor state to the Ottoman 
Empire, these islands belong to Turkey (Heraclides, 2010).  
Another assertion put forward by Turkey is that Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty 
has not yielded an overall transfer of the islands to another country (Van Dyke, 2005). 
Hence, the islands not mentioned by the name in these treaties are under the sovereignty 
of Turkey. 
Turkey also claims that there is no definition of “dependent” islands, and thus, 
interpretation of the term must be made not only in terms of historical, geographical, and 
geological factors, but also in terms of economic, social, and security aspects. 
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Furthermore, there are several islands for which there is no question of geographical 
“dependency,” which were not ceded to any other country by name. 
2. Greek Thesis 
The Greek thesis is centered on Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty and claims that 
Turkey had renounced all the sovereign rights to Italy and Greece outside of three miles 
(Heraclides, 2010). Another argument supporting the Greek thesis holds that the disputed 
islands are a part of the island group, and they are dependent or adjacent to other islands. 
It is also claimed that the wording of the Lausanne Treaty limits the islands that 
were left to Italy and Turkey to those mentioned in the treaty, and the entire Aegean 
Islands, except these, were ceded to Greece (Van Dyke, 2005). 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we construct a dataset for the disputed islands in the Aegean Sea. 
First, we import two open-source maps into ArcMap 10.3, which allows us to represent 
islands as polygons (ArcGIS, 2015). Second, we import these polygons into R (R Core 
Team, 2014), and use several library packages to create our dataset. Our final dataset 
consists of six parameters for each disputed island: perimeter, area, population, distance 
to Greece, distance to Turkey, and the territorial water area. These six parameters form 
the basis for an arbitration solution in Chapter IV. 
A. CREATING MAPS  
In this study, we use ArcMAP 10.3 to create maps and separate islands into 
polygons. ArcMAP is a desktop application for Geographic Information System (GIS) 
professionals, and is a part of ArcGIS for Desktop.  
We use two open-source maps: the Turkish Administrative Map (“Tur_adm,” n.d) 
and the Greek Administrative Map (“Prefectures HEMCO,” 2014). Both of these maps 
are available for download from the Internet. We merge these two maps to create one 
map for the disputed islands in the Aegean Sea. 
Our goal is to construct a list of disputed islands, and represent each island as a 
polygon for further data processing. The open-source maps, however, consist of polygon 
objects that represent a group of islands according to administrative municipalities. In 
some cases, a single polygon object includes more than 10 islands in the same 
administrative region. To construct a list of disputed islands, we first use a built-in 
function in ArcMap to break up a polygon object into several polygons, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Separation of polygons in ArcMAP. Source: ArcGIS (2015). 
 
 
We then name the islands of interests and municipalities manually. After naming 
each polygon, we aggregate all the features based on the “name” attribute as an 
individual polygon, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Illustration of aggregation in ArcMap. Source: ArcGIS (2015). 
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After these operations, we construct a map of islands in the Aegean Sea colored 
according to sovereignty, as shown in Figure 5. The disputed islands are listed as in 
Kurumahmut & Başeren (2004), and additional information can be found online 
(“Aegean Dispute,” n.d.). Although most islands are individually separated, some of them 
are close to each other, and most islands have adjacent rock formations or islets. In order 
to determine which islands or islets to include in our study, we need to take into 
consideration the location, size, and disputability of the islands. In the end, the dataset 
includes 39 disputed islands, which are shown in red and numbered in Figure 5. The 
names of these islands are listed in Table 1. 
To calculate the various parameters of an island, such as the perimeter and the 
area, we use the World Geodetic System (WGS), whose latest version is designated as 
WGS-84. The polygon areas and perimeters are calculated automatically in consonance 
with WGS-84. Since WGS-84 was established in 1984 and last revised in 2004, there 
may be some small differences between the real area and perimeter of a territory and the 
calculated values. In this research, the values calculated via WGS-84 projection are taken 
up, and further analysis is conducted based on these values. 
Table 1.   List of 39 disputed islands. 
ID Turkish Names Greek Names ID Turkish Names Greek Names 
1 ALATONISI ALATONISI 21 KENDIROZ LIADI 
2 ANDIIPSARA ANTIIPSARA 22 KIZKARDASLAR ADELFOI 
3 ANIDTRO ANIDTRO 23 KOCBABA LEVITHA 
4 ARDICCIK KINAROS 24 KOYUN ADALARI OUINOUSSES 
5 ASKINO ANDITILOS 25 NERGISCIK ARKI 
6 AVGO AVGO 26 PAKSIMADA PAXIMADA 
7 BULAMAC FARMAKONISI 27 PAKYA PACHEIA 
8 DIA DIA 28 PERGUSA PERGUSA 
9 DRAGONARA DRAGONARA 29 PETROKARAVA PETROKARAVA 
10 ESEK AGATHONISI 30 PLATI PLATI 
11 FORNOZ FURNI 31 SAFRAN SOFRANO 
12 HURSID FYMENA 32 SIRINA(ARDACIK) SYRNA 
13 IKI KARDASLAR UNIANISIA 33 STROGGILI STROGGILI 
14 ISTAKIDA ASTAKIDONISIA 34 UC ADALAR PLAKIDHA 
15 KALOLIMNI KALOLIMNOS 35 VENEDIK KALOGEROS 
16 KAMILUN CHAMILI 36 YALI YIALI 
17 KANDILLI KANDELIOUSSA 37 YIANISADA GIANISADA 
18 KARAVO(KARABONEZ) KARAVONISI 38 YUMURTA AVGO LASITHOU 
19 KARDAK IMIA 39 ZURAFA ZOURAFA 
20 KECI PSERIMOS - - - 
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Figure 5.  Aegean map colored according to sovereignty. 
 
Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” The 
disputed islands are numbered according to the list in Table 1. 
  
  
 17 
B. CONSTRUCTING THE DATASET 
For each of the 39 disputed islands included in this study, we need to combine our 
spatial data with some other data. In our overall dataset, we have six parameters that yield 
a dataset with the dimensions 39 x 6: 
1. Perimeter: Numeric value. Perimeter of the island (km). Values are pulled 
out via ArcMAP 10.3 as it is calculated via WGS-84. 
2. Area: Numeric value. Area of the island itself (km2). Values are pulled out 
via ArcMAP 10.3 as it is calculated via WGS-84. 
3. Population: Numeric value. Population data of the islands based on 2011 
census results are provided in a website (Brinkhoff, 2015). Only seven of 
the islands have a population. 
4. Distance to Greece: Numeric value. Distance from Greek mainland or 
Crete (km), the shorter between the two. Distance from Crete is included 
since, the size of the island is significantly bigger than any other island in 
the region. 
5. Distance to Turkey: Numeric value. Distance from Turkish mainland (km)  
6. Territorial Water Area: Numeric value. Area of territorial waters of the 
island (km2). Calculation of the territorial waters area is explained in 
Section C.  
The first five parameters can be calculated in a straightforward manner, while the 
last parameter, namely the territorial water area, requires some effort. In Article 15 of 
UNCLOS-III, “delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent 
coasts” are regulated, and the article articulates that:  
where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between them to the 
contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. 
(United Nations, 1982a) 
According to this definition, all points within an intersected area of territorial waters 
should be equally distant to each state’s nearest point on the baseline. Since the baseline 
is also a disputed issue, in our study, we assume that it is the nearest piece of land on the 
map. 
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Since Greece advocates that territorial waters may extend up to 12 miles, while 
Turkey advocates six miles, we study both of these scenarios separately. The most 
important and challenging part of our problem is to calculate the intersected areas, 
particularly if there are more than two intersected areas. To overcome this problem, 
Thiessen Polygons are used in our study to determine the median line between islands 
that have intersected territorial waters.  
1. Thiessen Polygons 
Thiessen polygons, also known as Voronoi diagrams, are named after the 
American Meteorologist Alfred H. Thiessen. Thiessen polygons are essentially Voronoi 
diagram (named after Ukrainian Mathematician Georgy Voronoi) that are used in 
geophysics and meteorology to analyze spatially distributed data (Brassel & Reif, 2010).  
Broadly speaking, according to Brassel and Reif (2010), Thiessen polygons are 
calculated starting with a finite set of sample points in a two dimensional plane. The 
polygons, one per sample point, partition the plane into convex polygons so that any 
location in a polygon is closer to its sample point than to any other sample point. 
Furthermore, the line segments forming the polygon boundaries are equidistant to the 
nearest sample points. An example of Thiessen polygons is illustrated in Figure 6.  
Polygons are essentially formed by a set of points. Keeping this in mind, a median 
line between two polygons can be calculated by extracting points of polygons and 
applying Thiessen polygons for each of them within an appropriate bounding box. In this 
study, we use Thiessen polygons to find the median line between intersected areas that 
represent territorial waters of islands. 
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Figure 6.  Illustration of Thiessen polygons. Source: ArcGIS (2015). 
 
 
2. Spatial Operations  
After importing the shape files containing polygon coordinates created via 
ArcMAP 10.3 tool into the R statistical environment, we categorize polygons of 
territories into three groups in terms of sovereignty. These three categories are Gray 
Zone, Greek, and Turkish. We use the following approach to calculate the territorial 
water of each island. 
1. If the expansion areas of a disputed island and any other territory intersect, 
create a list of coordinates of every point that forms these polygons of 
islands as shown in the left box of in Figure 7. 
2. Using these points, create Thiessen polygons setting an appropriate 
bounding box as in right hand side of Figure 7. For the six-mile scenario, 
the bounding box is the extension of the 12-mile buffered area of the 
disputed island. On the other hand, the extension of the 24-mile buffered 
area is used for the 12-mile scenario.  
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Figure 7.  Illustration of Step 1 and Step 2. 
 
 
 
3. Find the median line between the islands and merge all the Thiessen 
polygons remaining on each side of the median line. Thereby, form a 2-
polygon feature (area A and area B) divided by the median line, as seen in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8.  Illustration of Step 3. 
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4. Extract the area where the six-mile extension (in second scenario, the 12-
mile extension) and the related merged Thiessen polygon intersect. As 
seen in Figure 9, we extract the intersection between A and C.  
Figure 9.  Illustration of Step 4. 
 
 
5. If a disputed island intersects with more than one territory, first repeat 
steps 1–4 for each pair of selected islands and territory, and then calculate 
the intersection area of all extracted areas. 
6. If a disputed island does not intersect with any undisputed territory, 
expand the islands territorial water to six miles (in the second scenario, 12 
miles). 
After these operations, we obtain our individual territoral water areas for each 
disputed island. As the Turkish thesis and current status quo proclaim, the Aegean map, 
including the expansion of territorial waters by six nautical miles, is presented in 
Figure 10. Figure 11 illustrates the expansion of territorial waters by 12 nautical miles 
according to the Greek thesis. That concludes our spatial analysis and the preparation of 
our dataset for the application of game theory in an arbitration scheme. 
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Figure 10.  Six-nautical-mile expansion of territorial waters in the 
Aegean Sea. 
 
Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” 
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Figure 11.  Twelve-nautical-mile expansion of territorial waters in the Aegean 
Sea. 
 
Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” 
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IV. AN ARBITRATION SOLUTION 
In this chapter, we use the Nash arbitration scheme to propose a solution for how 
to divide the disputed islands between Greece and Turkey. The approach involves three 
steps: 
1. For each country, convert each island’s six parameters in Chapter III, 
Section B into utilities between 0 and 1. 
2. For each country, use AHP to calculate the weight of each parameter, and 
compute each island’s composite utility value. 
3. Apply the Nash arbitration scheme to propose a bargaining solution for 
dividing the disputed islands between Greece and Turkey.  
 
A. CONVERTING VALUES TO UTILITIES 
We have a list of 39 disputed islands. Each island is defined by six parameters, 
namely its perimeter, area, population, distance to Greece, distance to Turkey, and 
territorial water area. Since the units of these parameters are not the same, we need to 
convert each parameter to a utility between 0 and 1, before we can create a single utility 
value for each disputed island. 
Three different utility functions are considered in compliance with analytical 
judgment and the nature of the measure: a linear function, an increasing exponential 
function, and a decreasing exponential function. 
First, consider the population parameter. There are seven islands that are 
populated, and five of them have fewer than 200 people. The only two islands that have 
more than 200 people are Koyun with 792 people and Fornoz with 1274 people. 
Unpopulated islands take a 0 utility value as the minimum value, and Fornoz takes 1 as 
the maximum value. Since most islands have no population or a very small population, a 
linear utility curve appears to be appropriate. Equation (1) is used to calculate an island’s 
utility value for population, where a  represents the minimum population value of the set 
and b  represents the maximum population value. A linear utility curve is illustrated as 
shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Population utility curve. 
 
 
The perimeter, area, and territorial water area utilities are calculated by increasing 
exponential utility curves. In the calculation of these utilities, exponential scaling is used 
where a  stands for minimum value and b  stands for maximum value, in the value set. 
The parameter R is used as a smoothing parameter, which can be chosen by the user. 
Equation (2) is used for the scaling: 
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The smoothing parameter R  is selected as the value that ensures utilities are 
spread evenly in [0, 1]. To do so, we choose R so that the sample variance of the utility 
values is 1/12, which is the variance of the uniform (0, 1) random variable. An example 
of an increasing exponential utility curve is illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Territorial water area (six-nautical-mile) utility curve. 
 
 
On the other hand, the distance to Turkey and Greece utilities are calculated via 
decreasing functions, due to the fact that each country prefers an island closer to its 
mainland. In Equation (3), a  stands for minimum distance and b  stands for maximum 
distance.  
   (3) 
We choose the smoothing parameter R as in Equation (2). An example of 
converting values into utility values via decreasing exponential utility curves is illustrated 
in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Distance from Turkey utility curve. 
 
 
B. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL HIERARCHY PROCESS TO COMPUTE 
COMPOSITE UTILITIES 
In this section, we apply AHP to calculate weights of the parameters and compute 
country-based composite utilities of each disputed island for each case. Section 1 reviews 
the AHP and the calculation of the weights for each parameter. Section 2 presents the 
composite utilities of the disputed islands for each country in both six-mile and 12-mile 
territorial water scenarios. 
1. Weighting Parameters 
To weight the parameters, we use AHP. Generally speaking, AHP is a 
methodology that uses pairwise comparison between two parameters to construct a 
composite utility for all parameters. In pairwise comparisons, we use relative 
measurements to compare the importance between two parameters (Brunelli, 2016). “The 
ultimate scope of the AHP is that of using pairwise comparisons between alternatives as 
inputs, to produce a rating of alternatives, compatibly with the theory of relative 
measurement” (Brunelli, 2016). 
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Since AHP is used as a decision-making model, it helps the user control criteria 
and hierarchies among the parameters. As stated in Saaty (2016), “it is designed to cope 
with both the rational and the intuitive to select the best from a number of alternatives 
evaluated with respect to several criteria. In this process, the decision maker carries out 
simple pairwise comparison judgments which are then used to develop overall priorities 
for ranking the alternatives.” In other words, by determining relative importance between 
parameters, the user specifies which parameter is more important than the other one and 
by how much. Therefore, AHP allows the user to prioritize the parameters. 
In this thesis, AHP is used to make pairwise comparisons between model 
parameters, so that we can score our utilities in a weighted way. For the application of 
game theory in the next step, the two players, Turkey and Greece, should have their own 
utility values for each island. Therefore, AHP appears to be a reasonable way to calculate 
the utility of each disputed island for each country. 
The weighting process is done after the prioritization process of each country is 
completed. Each parameter of the model is compared to the other parameters in a scale 
from 1 to 9, as seen in Figure 15. For instance, if the area parameter is strongly more 
important than the perimeter parameter for Turkey, the relative importance of the area to 
perimeter is 5, and the relative importance of perimeter to area is 1/5. Applying the 
pairwise comparison to all pairs, we construct a 6 x 6 matrix.  
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Figure 15.  Weighting parameters by pairwise comparisons. 
 
 
 
As an example, Table 2 shows hypothetical results for Turkey, and those for 
Greece are shown in Table 3. The prioritization process is done using the author’s 
subjective observation and intuitive insights and according to the main interest of the 
countries. For example, since most of the population of the selected islands is Greek the 
population parameter is more important than the other parameters in the priorities of 
Greece. Specifically, in Turkey’s priority matrix, the population parameter has a relative 
importance of 1/7 versus the area parameter, while in the Greek priority matrix it is 1/3. 
Overall, the population parameter is more important to Greece. 
Likewise, an island’s distance to the Turkish mainland is more important to 
Turkey, while the island’s distance to Greece is more important for Greece. All 
prioritizations are subject to the opinions of the author and are chosen to reflect the 
interests of the countries in the region. The results may be different if the process is 
conducted by the experts of this topic.  
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Table 2.   Pairwise comparisons for Turkey. 
 Perimeter Area Population Distance 
to Greece  
Distance 
to Turkey 
Territorial 
Water Area 
Perimeter 1 1/7 1/3 1/5 1/9 1/9 
Area 7 1 3 7 1/3 1/3 
Population 3 1/3 1 3 1/3 1/5 
Distance to 
Greece  5 1/7 1/3 1 1/7 1/7 
Distance to 
Turkey 9 3 3 7 1 3 
Territorial 
Water Area 9 3 5 7 1/3 1 
 
Table 3.   Pairwise comparisons for Greece. 
 Perimeter Area Population Distance 
to Greece  
Distance 
to Turkey 
Territorial 
Water Area 
Perimeter 1 1/7 1/7 1/9 1/5 1/9 
Area 7 1 3 1/7 5 1/7 
Population 7 1/3 1 5 7 3 
Distance to 
Greece  9 7 1/5 1 7 3 
Distance to 
Turkey 5 1/5 1/7 1/7 1 1/7 
Territorial 
Water Area 9 7 1/3 1/3 7 1 
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After the prioritization process for each country, we compute the principal right 
eigenvector to produce the weight of each parameter. The weights of the parameters for 
each country are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4.   Weights of parameters. 
Country Perimeter Area Population Tw_Area Distance_Gr Distance_Tr 
Turkey 0.0244 0.1759 0.0845 0.2881 0.0454 0.3816 
Greece 0.0222 0.1312 0.2890 0.2210 0.2927 0.0436 
 
2. Calculating Composite Utilities 
After the calculation of weights, we are ready to compute country-based 
composite utilities for each disputed island. For each country, the utility for a disputed 
island is the weighted average over the island’s six parameter utilities, with the weights 
given in Table 4.  
In the six-mile territorial waters scenario (Turkish thesis), the composite utilities 
of the disputed islands are illustrated in Figure 16. For this scenario, the five most 
important islands for Turkey are in sequence: Koyun, Eşek, Hurşid, Bulamaç, and 
Nergisçik. For Greece they are: Dia, Fornoz, Koyun, Paksimada, and Hurşid. 
In the 12-mile territorial waters scenario (Greek thesis), the islands of Koyun, 
Eşek, Hurşid, Koçbaba, and Keçi are the five most important islands to Turkey. On the 
other hand, for Greece, they are Dia, Fornoz, Koyun, Yianisada, and Paksimada as shown 
in Figure 17. 
The ordering of the utilities shows that the islands that have a larger area of 
territorial waters and are closer to the Turkish mainland are more important to Turkey. 
On the other hand, islands that are populated and closer to the Greek mainland are more 
important to Greece. 
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Figure 16.  Weighted utilities of the islands for the six-nautical-mile expansion 
of territorial waters. 
 
*Yellow islands go to Greece and blue islands go to Turkey after the application of Nash 
arbitration scheme 
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Figure 17.  Weighted utilities of the islands for the twelve-nautical-mile 
expansion of territorial waters. 
 
*Yellow islands go to Greece and blue islands go to Turkey after the application of Nash 
arbitration scheme 
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C. NASH ARBITRATION SCHEME  
This section uses the Nash arbitration scheme to divide the disputed islands 
between Turkey and Greece. Section 1 reviews the methodology. Section 2 presents the 
results. 
1. Methodology  
The Nash arbitration scheme provides a solution for a two-player cooperative 
game. In this game, two players have a set of solutions, which includes an initial point 
that stands for a status-quo outcome if the two players cannot reach an agreement. “The 
outcome in any particular case will depend on the personalities and bargaining abilities of 
the two players” (Owen, 2013). Therefore, a plausible arbitration scheme should satisfy 
six axioms (Straffin, 1993; Owen, 2013):  
1. Individual rationality: In the arbitration solution, both players should do 
no worse than the status-quo outcome. 
2. Feasibility: The arbitration solution should lie in a convex polygon in the 
coordinate system that represents the bargaining set. 
3. Pareto optimality: In simple terms, Pareto optimality refers to a solution 
set in which it is impossible to make any player’s gain better off without 
making other player’s worse (“Pareto efficiency, ” n.d.). The arbitration 
solution should be Pareto optimal. 
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Suppose we identify an arbitration 
solution for an arbitration problem. When the feasible set is expanded, the 
new solution point can either be the same point or one of the new points 
that are added to the old set; the new solution point cannot be another 
point in the old set. 
5. Independence of linear transformations: If the utility of either player is 
transformed by a linear function, then the solution point is also 
transformed by the same function. 
6. Symmetry: If the convex polygon representing the bargaining set is 
symmetric about the line of slope +1 passing through both origin and the 
status-quo point, then the arbitration solution should reward the same 
value to each player. 
 
 36 
John Nash (1950) showed that there is a unique solution that meets all six axioms 
simultaneously, and the solution is referred to as the Nash arbitration solution. We apply 
the Nash arbitration scheme to our problem. This creates a reconciliation point between 
the countries by a partition of the islands according to each player’s utilities. Let us 
define a game where u represents the total utility of the islands for Turkey and v 
represents overall utility for Greece. In that sense, we can interpret them as 
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where, it is the utility of island i  for Turkey, and  if island i  is taken by Turkey, and 
  otherwise. Similarly, 
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where, ig is the utility of island i  for Greece, and 1iy =  if island i  is taken by Greece, 
and 0iy =   otherwise.  
In our model, we take the status-quo point (represented as *u and *v ) as 0 for 
both countries, which reflects the situation where both countries get nothing, in case 
either country refuses the arbitration solution. 
Nash showed that the unique solution that meets the six axioms presented in this 
section is the point that maximizes the function 
 ( , ) ( *)( *)g u v u u v v= − − ,  (6) 
where,  
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2. Results 
We run this model twice, once for the case where the territorial waters are six 
nautical miles, and once for the case where the territorial waters are 12 nautical miles. In 
the case of six nautical miles, the solution awards 22 of the disputed islands to Turkey 
and the other 17 islands to Greece. In the case of 12 nautical miles, the solution awards 
24 islands to Turkey and the other 15 islands to Greece. The sovereignty of the islands is 
listed in Table 5 and illustrated in Figures 16 and 17, respectively, where blue stands for 
Turkey and yellow stands for Greece. The map in Figure 18 shows the results for the six-
mile scenario, and the map in Figure 19 shows the results for the 12-mile scenario. 
Table 5.   Solution of the arbitration scheme based on case and country. 
ID Name of the  Island 
6 nm 
Case 
12 nm 
Case 
 
ID Name of the Island 
6 nm 
Case 
12 nm 
Case 
1 ALATONISI TURKEY TURKEY 
 
21 KENDIROZ TURKEY TURKEY 
2 ANDIIPSARA TURKEY TURKEY 
 
22 KIZKARDASLAR TURKEY TURKEY 
3 ANIDTRO TURKEY TURKEY 
 
23 KOCBABA GREECE GREECE 
4 ARDICCIK GREECE TURKEY 
 
24 KOYUN  GREECE GREECE 
5 ASKINO TURKEY TURKEY 
 
25 NERGISCIK TURKEY TURKEY 
6 AVGO GREECE GREECE 
 
26 PAKSIMADA GREECE GREECE 
7 BULAMAC TURKEY TURKEY 
 
27 PAKYA TURKEY TURKEY 
8 DIA GREECE GREECE 
 
28 PERGUSA TURKEY TURKEY 
9 DRAGONARA GREECE GREECE 
 
29 PETROKARAVA TURKEY TURKEY 
10 ESEK TURKEY TURKEY 
 
30 PLATI TURKEY TURKEY 
11 FORNOZ GREECE GREECE 
 
31 SAFRAN GREECE GREECE 
12 HURSID GREECE TURKEY 
 
32 SIRINA TURKEY TURKEY 
13 IKI KARDASLAR GREECE GREECE 
 
33 STROGGILI TURKEY TURKEY 
14 ISTAKIDA GREECE GREECE 
 
34 UC ADALAR TURKEY TURKEY 
15 KALOLIMNI TURKEY TURKEY 
 
35 VENEDIK TURKEY GREECE 
16 KAMILUN GREECE GREECE 
 
36 YALI TURKEY TURKEY 
17 KANDILLI TURKEY TURKEY 
 
37 YIANISADA GREECE GREECE 
18 KARAVO GREECE TURKEY 
 
38 YUMURTA GREECE GREECE 
19 KARDAK TURKEY TURKEY 
 
39 ZURAFA GREECE GREECE 
20 KECI TURKEY TURKEY 
 
- - - - 
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Figure 18.  Aegean map after partition for six-nautical-mile extension of 
territorial waters. 
 
Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” 
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Figure 19.  Aegean map after partition for twelve-nautical-mile extension of 
territorial waters. 
 
*Base maps sourced and adapted from “Tur_adm” and “Prefectures HEMCO.” 
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In both cases, it is significant that the islands that are closer to the Turkish 
mainland and have a larger area of territorial waters tend to be ceded to Turkey, since 
they are relatively more important to Turkey. At the same time, Greece receives the 
islands that have larger population and are closer to Greek mainland, as they are 
relatively more important to Greece.  
As seen in Table 5, in the case of six nautical miles of territorial waters, three 
islands, Ardıçcık, Hurşid, and Karavo, go to Greece; while in the case of 12 nautical 
miles of territorial waters, they go to Turkey. On the other hand, the Island of Venedik 
goes to Turkey in the case of six nautical miles of territorial waters, while in the case of 
12 nautical miles of territorial waters, it goes to Greece.  
In the case of six nautical miles of territorial waters, the five most important 
islands for Turkey are in sequence Koyun, Eşek, Hurşid, Bulamaç, and Nergisçik; while 
for Greece, they are Dia, Fornoz, Koyun, Paksimada, and Hurşid. At the end of the 
partition, Turkey gets Eşek, Bulamaç, and Nergisçik of these; however, Greece takes all 
five of the most significant islands. In the case of 12 nautical miles of terrtitorial waters, 
the islands of Koyun, Eşek, Hurşid, Koçbaba, and Keçi are the five most important 
islands to Turkey; while, for Greece, they are Dia, Fornoz, Koyun, Yianisada, and 
Paksimada. At the end of the arbitration Turkey gets Eşek, Hurşid, and Keçi of these; 
however, Greece takes all five of the most significant islands. 
It is worth pointing out that increasing the territorial waters from six nautical 
miles to 12 nautical miles does not necessarily increase the territorial waters of every 
island, since some islands sit close together. Consequently, changing the territorial water 
distance has a minor impact on the arbitration solution.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrates an approach to reconcile disputed islands between 
Turkey and Greece, by applying spatial analysis, utility theory, AHP, and the Nash 
arbitration scheme. We selected 39 disputed islands in the Aegean Sea according to 
location, size, and disputability, and considered six parameters: perimeter, area, 
population, distance to Greece, distance to Turkey, and territorial water area. We used 
spatial analysis tools to process the data, applied utility theory and AHP to compute how 
important each island is to each country, and then used the Nash arbitration scheme to 
divide the islands equitably between the two countries. 
Our approach relies upon several subjective assessments. First, in selection of the 
islands, we only focused on islands in the Aegean Sea. Therefore, some disputed islands 
south of Girit (Crete) are not included in the study, since these islands are considered to 
be in the Mediterranean Sea. Second, since the Island of Girit (Crete) is significantly 
larger than any other island in the region, it is considered part of the Greek mainland 
when calculating the distance between a disputed island and the Greek mainland. Third, 
when using AHP, priorities were assessed subjectively by the author based on limited 
knowledge about the interests of the countries. Finally, when applying the Nash 
arbitration scheme, we assigned the status-quo point to have 0 utility value for both 
countries.  
There are several different ways to extend this work. First, we can add other 
parameters, such as the natural resources on each island and merchant ship intensity 
within territorial waters of each island. Second, when applying AHP, government 
officials or scholars at research institutions may be able to provide a more objective 
assessment. Finally, our proposed approach can also be applied to other conflicted (or 
non-conflicted) regions, such as the South China Sea. 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF AEGEAN ISLANDS 
ID Turkish Name Greek Name Sovereignty 
1 AGIO OROS AGIO OROS GREEK 
2 AHIKERYA IKARIA GREEK 
3 ALATONISI ALATONISI GRAY  ZONE 
4 ALIMYA ALIMIA GREEK 
5 ANAFIYE ANAFI GREEK 
6 ANANES ANANES GREEK 
7 ANDIIPSARA ANTIIPSARA GRAY ZONE 
8 ANDRE ANDROS GREEK 
9 ANIDRO ANIDHROS GREEK 
10 ANIDTRO ANIDTRO GRAY ZONE 
11 ANTALYA ANTALYA TURKISH 
12 ARDICCIK KINAROS GRAY ZONE 
13 ARSURA PSATHURA GREEK 
14 ASKINO ANDITILOS GRAY ZONE 
15 AVGO AVGO GRAY ZONE 
16 AYDIN AYDIN TURKISH 
17 BALIKESIR BALIKESIR TURKISH 
18 BATNOZ PATMOS GREEK 
19 BIBER PIPERI GREEK 
20 BOLUKENDIRE/POLIKANDROS FOLEGANDROS GREEK 
21 BOZBABA AGIOS EVSTRATIOS GREEK 
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22 BOZCAADA BOZCAADA TURKISH 
23 BULAMAC FARMAKONISI GRAY ZONE 
24 CANAKKALE CANAKKALE TURKISH 
25 CAROS GYAROS GREEK 
26 CUHA KYTHIRA GREEK 
27 DEGIRMENLIK MILOS GREEK 
28 DELOS DILOS GREEK 
29 DIA DIA GRAY ZONE 
30 DRAGONARA DRAGONARA GRAY ZONE 
31 EDIRNE EDIRNE TURKISH 
32 EGRIBOZ EVVOIA GREEK 
33 ESEK AGATHONISI GRAY ZONE 
34 ESKINO SHOINOUSSA GREEK 
35 ESKINOS SIKINOS GREEK 
36 FLAKONDRA FLAKONERA GREEK 
37 FORNOZ FURNI GRAY ZONE 
38 GIRIT CRETE GREEK 
39 GOKCEADA IMROZ TURKISH 
40 GUMUS KIMILOS GREEK 
41 HERKE HALKI GREEK 
42 HIRSIZ PIPERI GREEK 
43 HRISTIYAN HRISTIANI GREEK 
44 HURSID FYMENA GRAY ZONE 
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45 IKI KARDASLAR UNIANISIA GRAY ZONE 
46 ILEKI TILOS GREEK 
47 INCIRLI NISYROS GREEK 
48 IPSARA PSARA GREEK 
49 ISKABOLOS SKOPELOS GREEK 
50 ISKADOS SKIATHOS GREEK 
51 ISKANDIL SKONTZURA GREEK 
52 ISKIRI SKYROS GREEK 
53 ISTAKIDA ASTAKIDONISIA GRAY ZONE 
54 ISTANBULYA ASTYPALEA GREEK 
55 ISTANKOY KOS GREEK 
56 ISTANOS DONOUSSA GREEK 
57 ISTAPORYA STAPODIO GREEK 
58 ISTENDIL TINOS GREEK 
59 IZMIR IZMIR TURKISH 
60 KALOLIMNI KALOLIMNOS GRAY ZONE 
61 KAMILUN CHAMILI GRAY ZONE 
62 KANDILLI KANDELIOUSSA GRAY ZONE 
63 KARAVI KARAVI GREEK 
64 KARAVO(KARABONEZ) KARAVONISI GRAY ZONE 
65 KARDAK IMIA GRAY ZONE 
66 KARO KEROS GREEK 
67 KASOT KASOS GREEK 
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68 KECI PSERIMOS GRAY ZONE 
69 KELEMEZ KALYMNOS GREEK 
70 KENDIROZ LIADI GRAY ZONE 
71 KERPE KARPATHOS GREEK 
72 KIRLANGIC ALONISSOS GREEK 
73 KIZKARDASLAR ADELFOI GRAY ZONE 
74 KOCBABA LEVITHA GRAY ZONE 
75 KOYUN ADALARI OUINOUSSES GRAY ZONE 
76 KOYUNLUCA SERIFOS GREEK 
77 KUCUK ANAFI PAKYA/MAKRA GREEK 
78 KUCUK CUHA ANTIKYHIRA GREEK 
79 KUCUK DEGIRMENLIK ANDIMILOS GREEK 
80 KUCUK PARA ANTIPAROS GREEK 
81 LERYOZ LEROS GREEK 
82 LIMNI LIMNOS GREEK 
83 LIPSO LIPSOS GREEK 
84 MANISA MANISA TURKISH 
85 MEIS KASTELLORIZO GREEK 
86 MIDILLI LESVOS GREEK 
87 MISKIN NIMOS GREEK 
88 MOKENE MYKONOS GREEK 
89 MUGLA MUGLA TURKISH 
90 MURTED KEA GREEK 
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91 N. ANATOLIKIS ATTIKIS 
N. ANATOLIKIS 
ATTIKIS GREEK 
92 N. ARGOLIDAS N. ARGOLIDAS GREEK 
93 N. ARKADIAS N. ARKADIAS GREEK 
94 N. ATHINION N. ATHINION GREEK 
95 N. CHALKIDIKIS N. CHALKIDIKIS GREEK 
96 N. DRAMAS N. DRAMAS GREEK 
97 N. DYTIKIS ATTIKIS N. DYTIKIS ATTIKIS GREEK 
98 N. EVROU N. EVROU GREEK 
99 N. FTHIOTIDAS N. FTHIOTIDAS GREEK 
100 N. IMATHIAS N. IMATHIAS GREEK 
101 N. KAVALAS N. KAVALAS GREEK 
102 N. KORINTHOU N. KORINTHOU GREEK 
103 N. LAKONIAS N. LAKONIAS GREEK 
104 N. LARISAS N. LARISAS GREEK 
105 N. MAGNISIAS N. MAGNISIAS GREEK 
106 N. PELLAS N. PELLAS GREEK 
107 N. PIERIAS N. PIERIAS GREEK 
108 N. PIREOS KE NISON N. PIREOS KE NISON GREEK 
109 N. RODOPIS N. RODOPIS GREEK 
110 N. SERRON N. SERRON GREEK 
111 N. THESSALONIKIS N. THESSALONIKIS GREEK 
112 N. VIOTIAS N. VIOTIAS GREEK 
113 N. XANTHIS N. XANTHIS GREEK 
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114 NAKSA NAXOS GREEK 
115 NERGISCIK ARKI GRAY ZONE 
116 PAKSIMADA PAXIMADA GRAY ZONE 
117 PAKYA PACHEIA GRAY ZONE 
118 PARA PAROS GREEK 
119 PELAGOS PELAGROS GREEK 
120 PERGUSA PERGUSA GRAY ZONE 
121 PETROKARAVA PETROKARAVA GRAY ZONE 
122 PLATI PLATI GRAY ZONE 
123 POLINO POLIEGOS GREEK 
124 RAKLIYA/ORENLI IRAKLIA GREEK 
125 RAPILA VELOPULO GREEK 
126 RODOS RODOS GREEK 
127 SAFRAN SOFRANO GRAY ZONE 
128 SAKIZ KHIOS GREEK 
129 SANTORON SANTORINI GREEK 
130 SEMADIREK SAMOTHRAKI GREEK 
131 SERFO SERIFOPULA GREEK 
132 SEYTAN GIOURA GREEK 
133 SIGIRCIKLAR RINEIA GREEK 
134 SIRA SYROS GREEK 
135 SIRINA(ARDACIK) SYRNA GRAY ZONE 
136 SISAM SAMOS GREEK 
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137 SOMBEKI SYMI GREEK 
138 STROGGILI STROGGILI GRAY ZONE 
139 TASOZ TASOS GREEK 
140 TEKIRDAG TEKIRDAG TURKISH 
141 TERME KYTHNOS GREEK 
142 UC ADALAR PLAKIDHA GRAY ZONE 
143 UNYE IOS GREEK 
144 UZUNCA MAKRONISOS GREEK 
145 VENEDIK KALOGEROS GRAY ZONE 
146 YABAN OFIDOUSSA GREEK 
147 YALI YIALI GRAY ZONE 
148 YAMURGI AMORGOS GREEK 
149 YAVUZCA/ISPINOS SIFNOS GREEK 
150 YIANISADA GIANISADA GRAY ZONE 
151 YILAN DHRAGONISI GREEK 
152 YUMURTA AVGO LASITHOU GRAY ZONE 
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